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INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, governors and state-level leadership are 
responsible for providing the initial response to an attack on their citizens.1 
With this great responsibility, however, comes only a few resources. 
Governors rely on state police and the National Guard to respond to 
situations.2 These forces are often ill-equipped to handle major incidents, 
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1.  DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NATIONAL RESPONSE 
FRAMEWORK 3 (Jan. 2008); Mitch Frank, Governors Prepare for Terror, TIME, (Oct. 12, 2001), 
available at http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,179305,00.html. 
 2.  John R. Brinkerhoff, Who Will Help the Emergency Responders?, THE HERITAGE 
FOUNDATION (June 2, 2005), available at http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/who-will-help-the-
emergency-responders. 
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much less catastrophes which often involve more than five hundred 
casualties.3 Twenty-two states have groups of civilians, separate from the 
police and National Guard, whose training is similar to armed forces 
reserve components.4 Today, these forces are called state defense forces 
(SDFs), and they originate from the state militias so important to the 
original American colonies’ defense.5 
While the governors of states with SDFs may call on the SDFs to 
defend against invasion,6 the SDFs’ validity and the effect of any action or 
armed engagement by such a force has not been tested in international law. 
If an SDF mobilized and engaged another force, either a non-national actor 
or a nation itself, would the use of force be legal?7 What if the force was 
used at or across a United States border, for instance, engaging the citizens 
or soldiers of Mexico?8 These questions raise constitutional questions 
domestically9 and legal use of force questions internationally.10 Ultimately, 
because the Constitution and federal law authorize the use of SDFs, the 
United States could be held responsible for their acts under the 
international theory of attribution.11 Because of this potential international 
 
 3.  See id. 
 4.  Michael J. Golden, The Dormant Second Amendment: Exploring the Rise, Fall, and Potential 
Resurrection of Independent State Militias, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1021, 1037 (2013). Armed 
forces reserve components can take many forms but often consist of units of men and women service 
members who serve “one weekend a month, two weeks a year,” thus keeping their training and 
readiness current without being a full time active duty service member. Guard and Reserve Frequently 
Asked Questions, MILITARY.COM, http://www.military.com/join-armed-forces/guard-and-reservefaqs. 
html#Whatis (last visited Sept. 4, 2014). 
 5.  Golden, supra note 4, at 1037. 
 6.  James Jay Carafano and Jessica Zuckerman, The 21st-Century Militia: State Defense Forces 
and Homeland Security, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 5 (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.heritage.org/ 
research/reports/2010/10/the-21st-century-militia-state-defense-forces-and-homeland-security. 
 7.  In an attempt to avoid confusion in discussion of sovereign nations as opposed to the fifty 
states of the United states, for the purposes of this Note, the word “state” refers to one of the fifty states 
of the United States. The word “nation” refers to any sovereign body. Any quotes have bracketed 
changed language to reflect this convention and, hopefully, avoid confusion. 
 8.  Mexican drug violence occurring at and near the United States border makes the possibility of 
altercation with Mexican citizens, police, or soldiers much more likely than any engagement with 
Canada at the United States-Canada border. See Bill Piatt & Rachel Ambler, Border Wars & the New 
Texas Navy: International Treaties, Waterways, and State Sovereignty after Arizona v. United States, 
15 SCHOLAR 535, 537–40 (2013). 
 9.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (giving constitutional legal authority to the states’ right to 
self-defense if invaded or “in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay”). 
 10.  See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (giving international legal authority about the right to self-
defense “against the territorial integrity or political independence of any [nation]”). 
 11.  Cedric Ryngaert & Jean d’Aspremont, INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION NON STATE 
ACTORS COMMITTEE, 3RD REPORT, at 8 (draft 2014), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm 
/docid/9B5612DF-6DEF-4AFD-BB8A408EAB402DBE. This discussion focuses on the potential 
humanitarian violations of armed opposition groups and is not specific to SDFs. 
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legal responsibility, the United States should either (1) adopt strict limits 
with more specificity delineating exactly when and how SDFs should 
engage international forces, or (2) eliminate SDFs as an outdated historical 
relic no longer necessary for national protection. 
I. STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES 
Understanding how SDFs fit within the United States’ overall military 
structure clarifies analysis of the international legal effect of SDF actions. 
The United States’ military structure is tiered, including dedicated federal 
forces, hybrid National Guard forces, and locally focused SDFs.12 The 
SDFs are ultimately subject to national control, but their local character 
both makes them a potent tool for immediate state-level defense and colors 
the legality of their actions in international law.13 
A. Federal Forces 
The United States military is divided into five main branches, 
including the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard.14 
All of these branches, except the Coast Guard, operate under the 
Department of Defense and report to their respective secretaries, but the 
Marine Corps reports to the Secretary of the Navy.15 The Army, Navy, and 
Air Force secretaries report to the Secretary of Defense who, in turn, 
reports to the President as commander in chief.16 
The Coast Guard operates under the Department of Homeland 
Security.17 However, after a declaration of war or when the President so 
directs, the Coast Guard operates under authority of the Department of the 
Navy.18 When the Coast Guard operates as a component of the Department 
of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard’s top officer, the Commandant,19 
reports directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security,20 who, in turn, 
 
 12.  See DOD 101, DEPT. OF DEFENSE, http://www.defense.gov/about/dod101.aspx (last visited 
May 17, 2015). 
 13.  See infra Part II.C. 
 14.  DIRECTORATE FOR ORG. & MGMT, PLANNING, OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF ADMIN. & MGMT, 
OFFICE OF THE SEC. OF DEFENSE, ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (2012), available 
at http://odam.defense.gov/Portals/43/Documents/Functions/Organizational%20Portfolios/Organiza 
tions%20and%20Functions%20Guidebook/DoD_Organization_March_2012.pdf. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, supra note 14. 
 17.  About Us, U.S. COAST GUARD, http://www.uscg.mil/top/about (last visited Jan. 23, 2015). 
 18.  Missions, U.S. COAST GUARD, http://www.uscg.mil/top/missions (last visited Jan. 23, 2015). 
 19.  DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. COAST GUARD CHART, available at http://www.dhs.gov/ 
xlibrary/assets/org-chart-uscg.pdf. 
 20.  DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY CHART, available at http://www. 
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reports to the President as a member of the Cabinet.21 When operating as a 
national force, any of these federal military divisions are authorized to use 
force internationally in self-defense,22 as permitted by a United Nations 
Security Council resolution,23 or potentially under the humanitarian 
intervention and responsibility to protect doctrines.24 
B. The National Guard 
In addition to the dedicated federal branches of the military, the 
National Guard serves as a “dual mission force.”25 National Guard units are 
by default under the control of a state or territory, but can be called into 
federal service by the President.26 The National Guard is divided into the 
Army National Guard and the Air National Guard.27 Because of its status as 
a dual mission force, each branch of the National Guard has both state and 
federal missions.28 When a National Guard unit is in state service, a state’s 
governor29 is the commander in chief of the state’s National Guard.30 When 
a unit is in federal service, the president is its commander in chief.31 
National Guard units must be properly trained, combat-ready forces that 
 
dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-orgchart.pdf. 
 21.  THE WHITE HOUSE, THE CABINET, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/ 
cabinet. 
 22.  U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 23.  Id. art. 42. 
 24.  2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 139, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 
2005). Note, the responsibility to protect doctrine is not necessarily universally accepted and thus may 
not be the strongest justification for the United States to rely on if using force internationally. See Ralph 
Zacklin, Comment, Beyond Kosovo: The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention, 41 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 923, 934–36 (2001); see also Jonathan I. Charney, Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in 
Kosovo, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1231, 1239–41 (1999). 
 25. ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, supra note 14. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  About the Guard, ARMY NAT’L GUARD, http://www.nationalguard.mil/AbouttheGuard.aspx 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2015). 
 28.  See ARNG Federal Mission, ARMY NAT’L GUARD, http://www.arng.army.mil/aboutus/Pages/ 
ARNGFederalMission.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Federal Mission] (stating the Army 
National Guard’s federal mission); ARNG State Mission, ARMY NAT’LGUARD, http://www.arng.army. 
mil/aboutus/Pages/ARNGStateMission.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2015) [hereinafter State Mission] 
(stating the Army National Guard’s state-level mission); Air National Guard – Welcome, ARMY NAT’L 
GUARD, http://www.ang.af.mil/main/welcome.asp (last visited Jan. 23, 2015) [hereinafter ANG 
Welcome] (showing the Air National Guard’s federal and state missions). 
 29.  See ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, supra note 14 (explaining the 
organization specific to the Army National Guard). If the SDF is operating in a territory or district 
rather than a state, the territory or district’s leader is the commander in chief. Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
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will be prepared and equipped to mobilize if called into federal service.32 
A state governor may request that the federal government deploy its 
National Guard.33  If such a request is granted, the National Guard will 
operate using federal funds.34 A state governor also has the ability to 
directly call the National Guard into service when there is a local 
emergency, such as a natural disaster, civil unrest, or search and rescue 
operations.35 If called into service directly by the governor, the National 
Guard will operate using state funds.36 The federal government can trump 
state power by simply denying a state’s request if it does not agree with 
that state’s need or means of using the National Guard to fulfill a certain 
mission.37 If a state attempts to mobilize its National Guard without federal 
funding, the federal government can preempt the state’s attempt. It can hold 
the National Guard in federal service by claiming supremacy of mission.38 
Thus, National Guard units provide an important service to states but are 
ultimately answerable to the federal government. Like dedicated federal 
forces, when operating internationally on behalf of the United States, the 
National Guard can legally use force when acting in self-defense, when 
authorized by a United Nations Security Council resolution, or, arguably, 
when the United States asserts a responsibility to protect.39 
C. State Defense Forces 
While states still have some control over their National Guard units, 
the Guard is now primarily a national reserve for the federal military 
forces.40 Therefore, many states maintain independent forces that are more 
directly controlled at the state level.41 These citizen forces, or SDFs, 
currently operate in twenty-two states.42 Historically, state-level forces 
were intended to “[assist] the state in its responsibility to protect [its] 
 
 32.  Federal Mission, supra note 28. 
 33.  See Heather Dwyer, The State War Power: A Forgotten Constitutional Clause, 33 U. LA. 
VERNE L. REV. 319, 354 (2012). 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  State Mission, supra note 28. 
 36.  Dwyer, supra note 33, at 354. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text. 
 40.  Dwyer, supra note 33, at 354. 
 41.  Golden, supra note 4, at 1037. 
 42.  Id. (citing Brent Bankus, State Defense Forces, an Untapped Homeland Defense Asset, State 
Defense Force Monograph Series (Winter 2005), available at http://www.minutemaninstitute.org/ 
writing-program/SDF.pdf). Note, SDFs are organized units separate from the unorganized militias 
consisting of all qualified persons available for service who are at least seventeen years of age. 
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citizens,” while also allowing citizens themselves to resist government 
overreaching.43 
Today, states and territories with SDFs are solely responsible for 
supporting such forces by organizing, training, equipping, funding, 
managing, and employing the SDFs legally.44 SDF members are not full-
time members of an armed service. Instead, they are trained in short, 
weekend-long or week-long sessions, consistent with their mission to come 
together and act only in response to specific incidents. 
SDFs are generally ground forces; however, some SDFs have naval 
and air components as well.45 Specifically, Alaska, New York, New Jersey, 
Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia, have active state naval 
militias.46  The state naval militias in Alaska,47 New York,48 New Jersey,49  
and Virginia50 qualify for federal funding. These state naval militias are 
subject to the laws and regulations related to the National Guard because 
they require membership overlap with members of the National Guard or 
other federal military force.51 The active state naval militias in Ohio,52 
 
 43.  Golden, supra note 4, at 1028–29. 
 44.  See NAT’L GUARD BUREAU, NGR 10-4, NATIONAL GUARD INTERACTION WITH STATE 
DEFENSE FORCES, 1-5(a) (2011), available at www.ngbpdc.ngb.army.mil/pubs/10/ngr10_4.pdf 
(particularly pertaining to SDFs organized under 32 U.S.C. § 109). NGR 10-4 is a part of 32 C.F.R. 
§ 564 (2012). 
 45.  See Bankus, supra note 42, at 31–32. 
 46.  See infra notes 47–58. 
 47.  Control of Alaska National Guard and Alaska Naval Militia, ALASKA STAT. § 26.05.060 
(2012); Composition of Organized Militia, ALASKA STAT. § 26.05.030(c) (2014) (“The Alaska Naval 
Militia consists of units . . . organized, trained, and administered as prescribed by state and federal law 
and regulation, and manned by personnel who are (1) members of the United States Naval Reserve or 
the United States Marine Corps Reserve and (2) enlisted, appointed, commissioned, or warranted under 
the laws and regulations of the United States.”). Note that this is not true of the Alaska State Defense 
Force, which is state run and does not require overlap with and does not receive funding from the 
federal government. See ALASKA STAT. § 26.05.030(d) (2014) (“The Alaska State Defense Force 
consists of units authorized by the governor and manned by volunteer personnel qualifying under state 
law and regulation.”); see Alaska State Defense Force, ALASKA STAT. § 26.05.100 (2014). 
 48.  N.Y. MIL. LAW § 43 (McKinney 2004). Note that the New York law specifies that ninety-five 
percent of the naval reserve must be comprised of United States Naval, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard 
reservists. 
 49.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 38A:8-1 (West 2013) (“The Naval Militia shall consist of such 
organizations and units of the Naval Reserve of the United States as may be prescribed by the Governor 
and shall be composed of officer and enlisted men who meet the qualifications for membership in such 
Naval Reserve and are so enrolled therein.”). 
 50.  VA. CODE ANN. § 44-62 (West 1973) (“Unless within one year after the organization of any 
unity of the naval militia at least ninety-five per centum of its personnel has been appointed or enlisted 
in the naval reserve, it shall be disbanded, and thereafter, unless its organization, administration, and 
training conform to the standard prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy for such units, it shall be 
disbanded.”). 
 51.  See Bankus, supra note 42, at 32. 
13_MUELLER_FORMAT 2 MACROS(DO NOT DELETE) 6/10/2015  10:42 PM 
2014] A STATE’S RIGHT TO MILITARY POWER 243 
South Carolina,53 and Texas54 are independent from federal forces. In fact, 
these forces are specifically intended to step in when the National Guards 
of their respective states are called to federal service or are otherwise 
unable to maintain public peace in the face of a disaster or emergency.55 
SDF air components, often referred to as state air wings, are currently 
active in only three states: California,56 Texas,57  and Vermont.58 
Although SDFs are intended as state-centered forces, they are not 
totally independent of national control.59 First, SDFs are authorized by 
federal statute.60 SDFs can be used domestically, at the president’s 
direction, to suppress rebellion or to enforce laws not practically 
enforceable via judicial proceedings.61 However, they can neither be 
considered part of the federal armed forces62 nor can they be deployed 
abroad.63 SDFs may train and cooperate with National Guard units during 
domestic operations, so long as federal funds and federal equipment are not 
used for the primary purpose of training or supporting SDFs.64 However, 
members of SDFs may not concurrently be members of a reserve 
 
 52.  See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5921.01 (West 1976). 
 53.  See S.C. CODE ANN. § 54-17-40 (2003). 
 54.  See TEXAS STATE GUARD, Maritime Regiment, available at http://www.txsg.state.tx.us/ 
maritime-regiment.aspx. 
 55. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5921.01 (West 1976) (“The governor shall organize and 
maintain . . . naval forces capable of being expanded and trained to defend this state whenever the Ohio 
national guard . . . is employed so as to leave this state without adequate defense.”). 
 56.  CALIF. STATE MILITARY RESERVE, BASIC HANDBOOK 15 (2013), available at http://www. 
calguard.ca.gov/CSMR/Documents/HANDBOOKREVISIONv5.pdf. 
 57.  TEXAS STATE GUARD, Air Component Command, http://www.txsg.state.tx.us/air-component-
command.aspx (last visited May 17, 2015). 
 58.  VERMONT STATE GUARD, Organization, http://www.vermontstateguard.org/organization/ (last 
visited May 17, 2015). 
 59.  See Authority of President to Send Militia into a Foreign Country, 29 U.S. OP. ATTY. GEN. 
322, 323 (1912). 
 60.  32 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012) (“In addition to its National Guard, if any, a State, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, Guam, or the Virgin Islands may, as provided 
by its laws, organize and maintain defense forces.”). 
 61.  10 U.S.C. § 332 (2012) (“Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, 
combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it 
impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial 
proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed 
forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion.”). 
 62.  32 U.S.C. §109(c) (2014) (“[SDFs] may not be called, ordered, or drafted into the armed 
forces.”); see, e.g., Golden, supra note 4, at 1037. 
 63.  BARRY M. STENTIFORD, THE AMERICAN HOME GUARD: THE STATE MILITIA IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 219 (Robert Doughty et al. eds., 1st ed. 2002); see also Authority of President to 
Send Militia into a Foreign Country, 29 U.S. OP. ATTY. GEN. 322, 323 (1912). 
 64. NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU, NGR 10-4, supra note 44. 
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component of the armed forces.65 
Unlike forces operating on the international stage under direct federal 
command, SDFs operate under state-level command.66 Thus, the 
international legality of action taken against foreign actors by an SDF is 
murkier than the international legality of self-defensive action, action 
authorized by the United Nations Security Council, or action taken as part 
of an asserted responsibility to protect by a federal United States military 
force.67 Recently, there has been discussion in the international law 
community about the legality of the use of force against non-national 
actors.68 As considered further below, this discussion could be interpreted 
to indicate that the use of force by non-national actors such as SDFs is 
attributable to the United States under international law. 
II. HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
AUTHORITY FOR SDFS 
This section will discuss the historical development of SDFs in 
American society and law in order to explain their treatment in 
international law. The historical purpose of SDFs to protect citizens against 
outside invasion by other sovereign nations or tribes hints at possible 
international legal categorization of SDFs as non-national armed actors.69 
Because SDFs historically stem from state militias designed, in part, to 
protect citizens from oppressive or overbearing governments, SDFs 
treatment under international law might also be analogized to that of armed 
opposition groups (AOGs).70 
 
 65. Id. This restriction does not apply to state naval militias, discussed above, which often require 
concurrent membership in a reserve component of the federal forces or National Guard. See supra notes 
47–51 and accompanying text. 
 66.  James Jay Carafano and Jessica Zuckerman, The 21st-Century Militia: State Defense Forces 
and Homeland Security, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Oct. 8, 2010), available at http://www.heritage. 
org/research/reports/2010/10/the-21st-century-militia-state-defense-forces-and-homeland-security. 
 67.  See supra notes 22–24 (providing citations to authority of assertion as to the United States 
federally commanded military’s right to use force). 
 68.  See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION USE OF FORCE COMMITTEE, REPORT ON 
AGGRESSION AND THE USE OF FORCE, at B.2.c (draft 2014), available at http://www.ila-
hq.org/download.cfm/docid/DA12E88E-5E44-4151-9540DC83D4A0EA78 (containing a section on the 
current international legal discussion surrounding the use of force by nations against non-national 
groups). 
 69.  Referred to as “non-state actors” in most publications, but here referred to as “non-national” 
so as to avoid confusion with references to the fifty states of the United States. Non-national actors in 
international law are generally discussed in the context of terrorist organizations, private cyber groups, 
and other extremist political, ideological, or religious groups. See id. 
 70.  AOGs are “collective entities that use organized military force, have an authority responsible 
for their acts, and have the means of respecting and ensuring at least the rules of international 
humanitarian law.” Ryngaert, supra note 11, at 5. 
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A. History of SDFs Prior to the Constitution 
The concept of state militias came to America from England during 
colonization.71 Militia duty in England was based on the idea that land-
owning individuals bore responsibility to assist in defending the 
sovereign’s land.72 While capable men were continuous members in a 
militia, responsibility to assist in defense only applied on an as-needed 
basis.73 Before the United States became a nation, the colonies followed 
this model and provided for their own defense against incursions.74 Men 
aged sixteen to around sixty75 were automatically considered part of the 
militia76 and were required to own and maintain necessary arms.77 
When the states began to form a union, they were motivated in part by 
the need to provide for a common defense.78 The need for a common 
defense was reflected in the writings of the time, including in the Federalist 
Papers. In Federalist No. 43, James Madison defended the idea of the 
federal government guaranteeing every state protection against invasion, 
stating “[a] protection against invasion is due from every society to the 
parts composing it.”79 However, Anti-Federalists sought to preserve the 
states’ power to make war, arguing that adopting the Federalist position 
would leave the states powerless to control the national government’s 
ability to make war and allow for the possibility of the president becoming 
a military despot.80 
Militias, in their original form in American history as precursors to 
SDFs, can be analogized to modern AOGs as a useful tool for 
understanding SDFs’ potential treatment under international law. The 
militias’ purpose aligned closely with the AOGs’ purposes.81 Militias were 
expected to fight against an oppressive government as well as an outside 
invading force.82 AOGs are groups that use force, take authoritative 
 
 71.  Golden, supra note 4, at 1026. 
 72.  Id. at 1025. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Dwyer, supra note 33, at 321. 
 75.  Golden, supra note 4, at 1026. 
 76.  Though certain exceptions apply, such as exemptions for unwilling men who could pay a fine 
to avoid service. Id. at 1027. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Dwyer, supra note 33, at 320–21 (citing the Federalist Papers generally). 
 79.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison). 
 80.  John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. R. 1639, 1658 (2002) (“In other 
words, it was not enough that the purse and sword would be in separate hands—Anti-Federalists wanted 
the purse and sword to be in different governments.”). 
 81.  Ryngaert, supra note 11, at 5. 
 82.  Dwyer, supra note 33, at 320–21 (citing the Federalist Papers generally). 
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responsibility for their acts, and “have the means of respecting and 
ensuring at least the rules of international humanitarian law.”83 AOGs are 
typically identified by their engagement in armed violence with an official 
national government,84 such as the groups currently opposing the 
incumbent regime in Syria.85 
B. The Constitution 
The individual colonies began to fear they would be unable to 
independently defend against a superior, larger, or better-organized force.86 
After much debate, the colonies agreed that the federal government would 
provide for the common defense.87 As such, the Constitution includes the 
Guarantee Clause, also called the Invasion Clause, which guarantees 
protection against invasion to every state in the Union: “[t]he United States 
shall guarantee to every state in this union a republican form of 
government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on 
application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature 
cannot be convened) against domestic violence.”88 
Based on the constitutional protection afforded by the Guarantee 
Clause, if a state is invaded, the United States has a federal duty to protect 
it.89 The invaded state has a concurrent right, however, to defend itself.90 In 
fact, there is evidence in the transcripts of the ratifying convention’s 
debates that the Guarantee Clause was designed to complement, not usurp, 
the states’ inherent right of self-defense.91 The constitutional text 
specifically addresses the states’ right to defend itself in Article I, which 
otherwise focuses on Congress’ power: 
No state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of 
tonnage, keep troops, or ships of war in time of peace, enter into 
any agreement or compact with another state, or with a foreign 
power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such 
 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  JOSEPH HOLLIDAY, SYRIA’S ARMED OPPOSITION 6–7 (March 2012), available at http://www. 
understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Syrias_Armed_Opposition.pdf. 
 86.  Dwyer, supra note 33, at 320–21. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  U.S. CONST. art IV, § 4. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Dwyer, supra note 33, at 319–20. 
 91.  Id. at 321–22 (citing James Madison, Debate From Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 16, 
1788), reprinted in 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 425 (Jonathan Elliot 2d ed. 1836)). 
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imminent danger as will not admit of delay.92 
While this language generally restricts state power, it also grants states 
a single affirmative right: the right to engage in war when invaded or in 
imminent danger.93 This right is referred to as the State War Power.94 
Houston v. Moore expressly interpreted the State War Power, providing 
that “[t]he power of the States over the militia . . . existed . . . before the 
establishment of the [C]onstitution, and there being no negative clause 
prohibiting its exercise by them, it still resides in the States.”95 
Under international law, this constitutional grant of power and 
affirmation in case law could mean that the SDFs’ actions are legally 
attributable to the United States. Specifically, Article 5 of the United 
Nation’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts specifically states that the conduct of an entity “which is 
empowered by the law of that [nation] to exercise elements of the 
governmental authority shall be considered an act of the [nation] under 
international law” when that entity is acting in such “capacity in a 
particular instance.”96 The entrenchment of SDFs in United States’ law, 
evidenced by both constitutional and judicial authority, shows that SDFs 
are “empowered” by national law.97 Because of this, an SDF’s actions 
would be legally attributable to the United States.98 If an SDF uses force in 
self-defense under international law, no question of legality should arise.99 
However, if an SDF uses force not clearly sanctioned under international 
law, the United States could thus be held accountable for a rogue SDF’s 
conduct.100 
C. Interpreting the Constitutional Grant of Power 
In the early years of the United States, the state militias thrived, even 
developing volunteer companies that specialized in areas such as cavalry 
 
 92.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
 93.  Dwyer, supra note 33, at 319. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. 1, 9 (1820). Note the quoted language goes on to clarify that the 
states may so act only if their action is not “absolutely repugnant to the authority of the Union.” Id. 
 96.  Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 56th 
sess, Dec. 12, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/83 [hereinafter ILC Draft Articles]. 
 97.  See id. (explaining that by being empowered by U.S. law, SDFs’ conduct will be considered 
an act of the U.S. under international law). 
 98.  See id. 
 99.  See U.N. Charter art. 51 (providing for the legality of the use of force in international law 
only when defensive in nature); see also ILC Draft Articles, supra note 96, art. 21 (“The wrongfulness 
of an act of a State is precluded if the act constitutes a lawful measure of self- defence [sic] taken in 
conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.”). 
 100.  See ILC Draft Articles, supra note 96. 
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and artillery.101 These strong and specialized militias helped the United 
States survive early conflicts like the War of 1812 and conflicts with 
Native Americans.102 
Soon, however, disputes over the Constitution’s grant of state control 
over militias led to judicial refinements. The Constitution grants Congress 
the power to “call[] forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, 
suppress insurrections and repel invasions”103 and to “provide for 
organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such 
part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States.”104 
However, that power is limited, and militias are subject to the control of the 
states in all other respects and purposes.105 So, a state may use its militia to 
repress insurrection.106 The militia may also be used to repel invasion of a 
state within its own territory when that invasion is directed against the 
state’s own existence or authority.107 A state’s power to use its militia in 
these ways exists concurrent to Congress’s authority to call forth a states’ 
militia to do the same in aid of the United States.108 Additionally, states 
preserve the power to both legislate for and organize their militias.109 When 
a state is faced with an insurrection or invasion, it has discretion to 
determine whether the incident warrants calling forth the militia rather than 
relying on civil authority such as the police force.110 
By the time early cases like Houston v. Moore distinguished and 
defined the states’ power over their militias, the militias themselves had 
moved from a mandatory commitment to a voluntary model.111  SDFs now 
survive only on a voluntary basis, which is necessary given today’s large 
and diverse population.112 Additionally, the contemporary absence of 
significant SDF use signals, to a certain extent, the alignment of state and 
national interests in the United States and the representative nature of the 
United States government in the international arena.113 
 
 101.  Golden, supra note 4, at 1027. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl 14. 
 104.  Id. at cl. 15. 
 105.  Houston, supra note 95, at 50. 
 106.  Id. at 54. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Dunne v. People, 94 Ill. 120, 126–27 (1897). 
 110.  Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 45 (1849). 
 111.  Golden, supra note 4, at 1028. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  See Anthea Roberts & Sandesh Sivakumaran, Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors: Engaging 
Armed Groups in the Creation of International Humanitarian Law, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 107, 124 (2013) 
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More recent case law has led scholars to question whether SDFs are 
included in the broader definition of “militia” and thus subject to similar 
federal obligations as the National Guard.114 Perpich v. Department of 
Defense consigned the original militias to federal authority, emphasizing 
that National Guard units could be ordered to active duty of the United 
States without the consent of the unit’s state governor, and without a 
declaration of a national emergency.115 However, Perpich expressly affirms 
the power of states to organize their own militias, thus upholding the right 
of states to use their SDFs in self-defense as provided for in the 
Constitution.116 
The constitutional, statutory, and judicial treatment of SDFs cement 
their legal place in the United States state-level national security response 
system. Such treatment also has implications in international law. Because 
United States law condones the existence and limited use of SDFs, the 
United States could be held responsible on the international legal stage 
should an SDF use force against a foreign nation or commit any other 
transgression of international law.117 However, the United States could seek 
to defend itself in international law by asserting that an SDF acted outside 
of its legal authority118 so that the SDFs’ actions are not attributable to the 
United States because they were not sanctioned.119 The next section 
discusses the boundaries of SDFs’ power in the context of federalism and 
domestic international relations. 
 
(citing Jan Klabbers, (I Can’t Get No) Recognition: Subjects Doctrine and the Emergence of Non-State 
Actors, NORDIC COSMOPOLITANISM: ESSAYS IN INT’L LAW FOR MARTII KOSKENNIEMI, 351, 359 (Jarna 
Petman & Jan Klabbers eds., 2003) (“to argue that non-state entities are by definition represented by 
their governments is implausible where the very raison d’être of those nonstate (sic) entities is to deny 
the representative nature of their governments.”)). 
 114.  Thaddeus Hoffmeister, An Insurrection Act for the Twenty-First Century, 39 STETSON L. 
REV. 861, 903 n. 255 (2010). 
 115.  496 U.S. 334, 335 (1990). 
 116.  Id. at 353–54 (“Were it not for the Militia Clauses, it might be possible to argue on like 
grounds that the constitutional allocation of powers precluded the formation of organized state militia. 
The Militia Clauses, however, subordinate any such structural inferences to an express permission while 
also subjecting state militia to express federal limitations.”). 
 117.  See supra notes 96–100 and accompanying text. 
 118.  An SDF would act outside its legal authority if it engaged in any action other than that 
protecting against insurrection or invasion or if it acted under the authority of a leader other than state 
or federal authorities. See supra III.B, III.C. 
 119.  It is unclear whether this defense would succeed as Article 7 of the ILC Draft Articles, supra 
note 96, provides that conduct of entities empowered by the nation “shall be considered an act of [that 
nation] under international law . . . even if [the act] exceeds [the entity’s] authority or contravenes 
instruction.” 
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III. FOREIGN RELATIONS POWERS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Prior sections of this Note establish that SDFs exist under state control 
separate from federal forces and that their historical and constitutional 
origins establish their domestic legality. This section discusses the states’ 
power in the foreign relations field. It addresses the implications under 
domestic and international law of a hypothetical situation in which a state 
uses its SDF to respond to a border incursion or invasion in violation of the 
United States’ international relations policy. 
A. International Relations Power and Preemption 
United States case law generally restricts international powers to 
nations themselves. Although the Tenth Amendment provides that powers 
not otherwise disposed of in the Constitution are reserved to the states,120 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation holds that international 
powers cannot be reserved to the states because the states never possessed 
international powers.121 “International powers” pursuant to Curtiss-Wright 
include the power to levy war, conclude peace, and contract alliances.122 
These same international powers, as well as the power to “make treaties 
[and] to maintain diplomatic relations” are, according to Curtiss-Wright, 
vested in the federal government because these powers are inherent in 
nationality.123 The Court also explains that the president is the “sole organ” 
of the nation’s international relations.124 
While the international relations power is vested in the federal 
government, more specifically, in the president, SDFs are described as part 
of the states’ concurrent power to protect themselves from incursion or 
invasion.125 In other words, the states’ power to protect themselves coexists 
with the federal international relations and war making powers. Concurrent 
powers can, however, fall victim to preemption.126 Federal law preempts 
state law when Congress enacts a statute that expressly preempts a state 
provision (“express preemption”); when Congress has legislated so heavily 
in a field that there is no room left for states to regulate conduct in that field 
(“field preemption”); and when state laws conflict with federal law, making 
it impossible to comply with both laws or fulfill the purpose and objectives 
 
 120.  U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 121.  299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936). 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. at 318. 
 124.  Id. at 320. 
 125.  See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 126.  See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500–01 (2012) (delineating circumstances 
under which concurrent powers are preempted.). 
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of the federal law (“conflict preemption”).127 While there exists a general 
presumption against preemption, the presumption is “restricted to the 
narrowest of limits” in international relations cases.128 This explains the 
primacy of federal law and the president’s ability to control not only the 
primarily federal forces, but also the SDFs.129 
B. Declaring War and Engaging in War 
The Constitution clearly delineates the power to declare war to 
Congress.130 A declaration of war essentially publicizes the legal relations 
between the United States and other entities.131 It also gives the United 
States government enhanced domestic powers, including the powers to 
seize foreign property, conduct warrantless surveillance, arrest enemy 
aliens, and control transportation systems.132 However, a declaration of war 
is, to some extent, a technicality or formality.133 Nations can be engaged in 
hostilities and limited combat without a formal declaration of war.134 For 
instance, American history includes only five formal declarations of war,135 
while reports suggest there are approximately 234 instances in which the 
United States has used its armed forces for non-normal peacetime 
purposes.136 
As set forth above, states using their SDFs can engage invading forces 
outside of a declared war, within certain limitations.137 Specifically, states 
may act when exposed to armed hostility from another political entity.138 A 
political entity is generally an organized unit with political objectives and 
 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 68 (1941). 
 129.  See supra note 59–61 and accompanying text. 
 130.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (the “Declare War Clause”). 
 131.  Yoo, supra note 80, at 1672. 
 132.  Id. at 1672–73. 
 133.  See id. at 1672 (“Declarations do simply what they say they do: they declare.”). 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  They are: the War of 1812, the Mexican War of 1846, the Spanish American War of 1898, 
World War I declared in 1917, and World War II declared in 1941. Ellen C. Collier, Instances of Use of 
United States Forces Abroad, 1798-1993, NAVAL HISTORY AND HERITAGE COMMAND (Sept. 12, 
1997), available at http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/foabroad.htm. 
 136.  Id. The Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf War, and the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq are among the United States’ modern undeclared wars. See BARBARA SALAZAR TORREON, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42738, INSTANCES OF USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 
1798-2014, 2–29 (Jan. 13, 2014); see also George Friedman, What Happened to the American 
Declaration of War?, FORBES (March 3, 2011, 5:10 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2011/ 
03/30/what-happened-to-the-american-declaration-of-war/. 
 137.  Dwyer, supra note 33, at 332. 
 138.  California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1091 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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characteristics.139  Political entities that could foreseeably provoke action 
from an SDF include, for example, Mexican drug cartels and transnational 
gangs.140 These gangs and cartels are discussed in the next section. 
C. Categorizing Mexican Drug Cartels as Political Entities Capable of 
Provoking the Internationally Legal Use of Force by SDFs 
Drug cartels currently operating throughout Mexico threaten the 
security of United States’ citizens141 and could be considered political 
entities under international law. The cartels, arguably, are engaged in a 
non-international armed conflict with the Mexican government, which rises 
above the level of rebellion to the level of insurgency.142 Additionally, the 
cartels are well-organized and well-trained. For instance, the Los Zetas 
cartel is composed of former Mexican Army Airborne Special Forces, 
indicating they understand the importance of command structures and also 
have intimate knowledge of military equipment and techniques.143 These 
cartels could thus justifiably be categorized as entities with enough political 
and internal structural organization to legalize an SDFs’ use of force 
against a cartel.144 Thus, the United Nations Charter and other sources of 
international law do not address the applicability of international law to 
non-national entities such as SDFs. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The United Nations Charter guides the use of force in international 
 
 139.  Dwyer, supra note 33, at 324. 
 140.  See Letter from Rick Perry, Governor, State of Texas, to Barack Obama, President, The 
United States of America (Aug. 9, 2010), http://governor.state.tx.us/files/press-office/080910_Perry 
Obamaletter.pdf [hereinafter Perry Letter] (informing President Obama of the threat to the safety of 
citizens along the Texas-Mexico border and requesting heightened federal assistance in responding to 
this threat). 
 141.  See TEX. DEPT. OF PUB. SAFETY, TEXAS PUBLIC SAFETY THREAT OVERVIEW 2013 13–25 
(2013), available at http://www.txdps.state.tx.us/director_staff/media_and_communications/threat 
overview.pdf; see, e.g., Rogue Bullet Shot Across Mexico Border Hits El Paso Woman, NBC NEWS 
(Feb. 21, 2012), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/02/21/10471871-rogue-bullet-shot-across-
mexico-border-hits-el-paso-woman; Texas Governor Condemns Stray Bullets Fired Across U.S. 
Border, CNN JUSTICE (Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/08/23/texas.border.bullet. 
investigation/; Adriana Gómez Licón, Mexican Gunman Fires Across Border Toward U.S. Highway 
Workers, EL PASO TIMES (Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.elpasotimes.com/ci_17087113 (providing only 
several of countless examples of cross-border violence happening often across the U.S.-Mexico border). 
 142.  Nagesh Chelluri, A New War on America’s Old Frontier: Mexico’s Drug Cartel Insurgency, 
210 MIL. L. REV. 51, 56, 78 (2011). 
 143.  Id. at 53 n. 3. 
 144.  See infra notes 154–165 and accompanying text. 
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law.145 Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits the use of force or threatened 
use of force “against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any [nation].”146 Under Article 51, U.N. member nations—as opposed to 
states and territories that employ SDFs—may only resort to the use of force 
in self-defense when an armed attack occurs against that nation.147 These 
articles focus on national actors and national borders as primary to 
triggering the right to use force in defense against an armed attack. Other 
forms of international law emulate this, considering only those rules put in 
place by national actors as relevant in international law.148 Thus, the U.N. 
Charter and other historic international law sources do not address the 
applicability of international law to non-national entities such as SDFs. 
Recently, however, there has been a surge in international law 
(including treaties and customary international law) recognizing the 
growing importance of non-national actors in general and in the law 
governing armed conflict.149 The current accepted theory is that non-
national entities, such as armed groups, may “enjoy rights, obligations, and 
enforcement capacities under international law” as those that “are created 
or recognized by [nations].”150 
This means that a rogue SDF using unprovoked force against a United 
Nations member nation would act in violation of international law.151 The 
United States federal government would almost certainly condemn that 
SDF’s actions because SDFs are limited to defense against actual or 
imminent invasions.152 Such an attack would also violate domestic law 
since the Constitution limits SDFs’ actions to defense against actual or 
imminent invasions.153 However, if an incursion or invasion of a state is 
considered an armed attack under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, an SDF’s 
potential defensive action may be legal under international law. 
The most prominent elucidation of armed attacks under international 
 
 145.  U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 148.  Anthea Roberts & Sandesh Sivakumaran, Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors: Engaging Armed 
Groups in the Creation of International Humanitarian Law, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 107, 111 (2012). 
 149.  Id. at 108; see also INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION USE OF FORCE COMMITTEE, REPORT 
ON AGGRESSION AND THE USE OF FORCE, at B.2.c (draft 2014), available at http://www.ila-
hq.org/download.cfm/docid/DA12E88E-5E44-4151-9540DC83D4A0EA78 (containing a section on the 
current international legal discussion surrounding the use of force by nations against non-national 
groups). 
 150.  Sivakumaran, supra note 113, at 115. 
 151.  See U.S. CONST. art 1, § 10, cl. 3. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. 
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law is found in the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ’s) decision in 
Nicaragua v. United States.154 Nicaragua distinguishes between “armed 
attack” and “mere frontier incidents.”155 This distinction allegedly created a 
gap allowing low-level attacks to occur because an attack characterized as a 
mere frontier incident does not trigger the victim nation’s self-defense 
rights.156 However, cumulative attacks “could reach the gravity threshold” 
to be considered armed attacks given sufficient evidence.157 And armed 
attack includes both actions by an official armed force across an 
international border, as well as actions by armed bands, groups, irregulars, 
or mercenaries sent by or acting on behalf of a nation.158 Based on this case 
alone, it appears that SDF actions can only be legal under international law 
if a major invasion occurs 
The ICJ further elucidated the concept of armed attack in Iran v. 
United States (the Oil Platforms Case), by including “the mining of a single 
military vessel” in the concept of armed attack.159 However, the Oil 
Platforms Case makes clear that a nation cannot respond to attacks on 
unmarked vessels of that nation.160 The Oil Platforms Case further limits 
the circumstances under which a nation can respond in self-defense; it finds 
that a missile that hit a United States ship fell below the threshold of armed 
attack because the missile could not have been aimed “at the specific 
vessel.”161 Since there was no armed attack on the United States, its right to 
use force in self-defense was not justified.162 This opinion signals to states 
that their SDFs should not defend against unintentional or minor border 
incursions, even if those minor incursions are recurring. Such incursion or 
invasion does not rise to the level of armed attack justifying the use of 
force in self-defense under international law.163 
 
 154.  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
103, ¶ 195 (June 27). 
 155.  Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, The Notion of “Armed Attack” in the Nicaragua Judgment and its 
Influence on Subsequent Case Law, LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 461, 462 (2012). 
 156.  Id. at 464–65. 
 157.  Id. at 465. 
 158.  Id. at 463. 
 159.  Oil Platforms Case (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 324, ¶ 72 (Nov. 6). 
 160.  Id. at ¶ 64. The ship in question “was not flying a United States flag, so that an attack on the 
vessel is not in itself to be equated with an attack on that State.” 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Note that this decision is not without controversy. Judge Buergenthal of the ICJ criticized the 
Court’s evidentiary approach in his separate opinion in this case. John Norton Moore, Jus ad Bellum 
Before the International Court of Justice, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 903, 940–41 (2011–12). Additionally, the 
ICJ “applied an overly cabined assessment of necessity and proportionality in” its analysis of the facts. 
Id. at 941. Thus, this opinion may lend less persuasive authority for its propositions in international law 
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Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, (the Wall Opinion) refines the conception of an 
armed attack as it applies to non-national actors.164 The Wall Opinion 
explains that non-national actors can carry out an armed attack triggering 
the right to self-defense.165 Thus, a state need not be invaded by a nation to 
trigger its right to employ an SDF in self-defense legally under 
international law.166 
Finally, the ICJ’s decision, Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo (the Congo Case), influences the contemporary conception of non-
national armed groups’ right to use force internationally.167 The Congo 
Case addresses the international legal responsibility of Congolese non-state 
military forces and is therefore relevant to the potential international legal 
treatment of SDFs using force internationally.168 The opinion relays that 
armed attacks “by bands or irregulars directly or indirectly supported by” a 
nation give rise to a right of defense against the nation itself.169 So, if an 
SDF could be considered a “band or irregular[]” supported by the United 
States, its actions could trigger a right to self-defense against an 
opponent.170 However, given the domestic legal role of SDFs as forces 
employed solely in self-defense against foreign forces when a state is 
invaded,171 an SDF acting legally should never provoke a right of self-
defense.  The Congo Case shows non-national armed groups’ applicability 
by finding that such groups can trigger the right to use force in self-
defense.172 
V. ANALYSIS & CONCLUSION 
Because of the potential international legality of SDFs acting in self-
defense,173 the United States should maintain clear federal policy and strict 
 
than other more widely accepted ICJ opinions. 
 164.  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 242 (Jul. 9). 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  See id. (explaining that non-state actors can trigger self-defense rights). 
 167.  See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 
2005 I.C.J. 168 (Dec. 19). 
 168.  Moore, supra note 163, at 945. 
 169.  Id. at 945–46. 
 170.  See id. (explaining the Congo Case’s holding that non-state actors can trigger the right to self-
defense). 
 171.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (lending constitutional legal force to the states’ right to self-
defense if invaded or “in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay”). 
 172.  U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 173.  Only self-defense, not U.N. Security Council sanctioned or humanitarian intervention use of 
force, is discussed because only self-defensive actions of SDFs are legal under United States law. Also, 
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unified guidance to govern SDFs. To better understand this reasoning, 
consider the current tension at the United States-Mexico border instigated 
by Mexican drug cartel violence. In recent years, Americans have been 
negatively affected by increasing drug cartel and gang related violence at 
the borders in Texas and New Mexico.174 Stray bullets from the Mexican 
side of the border have hit at least one innocent woman in the United 
States.175 Stateside-based gangs and north-of-the-border factions of 
Mexican cartels possess weapons such as vehicle-borne improvised 
explosive devices (VBIEDs) and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).176  
Mexican pirates have attacked fishing boats in border reservoirs, killing 
innocent American citizens.177 
These acts of aggression provoked the Texas Governor to author a 
letter to President Obama in 2010 calling for heightened federal 
assistance.178 In order to better secure the border, the governor requested 
1,000 additional National Guard troops and recommended deploying 
unmanned aerial vehicles to provide surveillance and intelligence.179 The 
letter also referenced the important role that Texas state law enforcement 
and military forces play in defending the border.180 While the letter 
contains no indication that the governor intends to use the SDFs available 
to him for acts of overt aggression against Mexico or the drug cartels, the 
letter puts President Obama on notice of the governor’s Invasion Clause 
(referred to above as the Guarantee Clause) responsibilities by outlining the 
specific threats and proposed responses.181 
In response to the letter, John Brennan, former Assistant to President 
Obama for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, ensured that about 
255 additional National Guard troops would be sent to the border.182 
 
it is unlikely that an SDF would ever be sanctioned to use force by the U.N. Security Council, and it is 
unlikely that an SDF would attempt to intervene internationally in protection of human rights. 
 174.  See infra notes 175–180 and accompanying text. 
 175.  Mother Pushing Stroller in Texas Hit by Bullet from Mexico, BORDERLAND BEAT (Feb. 21, 
2012), http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2012/02/mother-pushing-stroller-in-texas-hit-by.html. 
 176.  TEX. DEPT. OF PUB. SAFETY, TEXAS PUBLIC SAFETY THREAT OVERVIEW 2013 16 (2013), 
available at http://www.txdps.state.tx.us/director_staff/media_and_communications/threatoverview. 
pdf. 
 177.  William Booth, Mexican Pirates Attack Texas Fishermen on Falcon Lake, Which Straddles 
Border, WASHINGTON POST (May 30, 2010), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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Further, President Obama’s current policy toward Mexico and his recent 
meeting with President Enrique Peña Nieto of Mexico indicate that border 
security is a topic of discussion for both countries.183 Presidents Obama and 
Nieto agree that border security is necessary to foster a healthy economic 
relationship and important to promote a collaborative approach to citizen 
security.184 Thus, the federal government has responded to this conflict. 
Because the federal government is currently maintaining relations 
with Mexican officials to respond to and monitor border violence,185 a 
possible SDF action could undermine United States foreign policy or the 
war-making power, both of which are rightfully assigned to the executive 
branch and the federal government as a whole, respectively.186 An SDF 
could defend its state legally by asserting that any action taken is a lawful 
response to an actual invasion or an imminent threat that could not be 
delayed—the two preconditions to SDF action pursuant to the 
Constitution.187 This defense, and the outcome of any domestic legal case, 
might be a question of fact, dependent on whether there was a threat of 
sufficient imminence or an invasion requiring action. 
Irrespective of the outcome of such domestic legal squabbles, 
international law would most likely find the SDF’s action attributable to the 
United States.188 The United States could thus find itself answerable in the 
international legal arena for the acts of a rogue domestic group that is 
constitutionally sanctioned but whose actions directly contravene current 
United States foreign policy.189 Additionally, if an initial response by an 
SDF to a threat or invasion continued and escalated from the first shots 
fired to an enduring campaign, the United States could find itself dragged 
into an international conflict as the SDF’s resources would likely not 
support a prolonged engagement.190 Because of this danger, the United 
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States should either adopt strict and clear guidelines delineating the actions 
SDFs can take, or outlaw these entities as historical relics no longer 
necessary for protection against armed invasion. 
 
